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LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
I. VIDEO GAMES
A. Copyright
1. Copyright Infringement Of Video Games: When The Chips Are
Down
A recent federal district court decision has given a video game man-
ufacturer the power capsules it needs to gobble infringing ghost mon-
sters. In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon' the court held that a
modification kit infringed Midway's distinct copyright in the computer
program stored in the memory chips directing the popular Pac-Man
video game.
Midway Manufacturing Co. ("Midway") holds copyright registra-
tions for the audiovisual effects in the Pac-Man video game and for the
computer programs imprinted in the six silicon Read Only Memory
(ROM) chips that direct the game's play sequences and audiovisual dis-
plays.2 Pac-Man is played on machines marketed by Midway and deco-
rated with the well-known Pac-Man cartoon figures.
Defendants, referred to collectively by the Midway court as "Slay-
ton,"3 developed a kit ("Cute-See") designed to make the game more
challenging for experienced players. Such a kit would find a ready mar-
ket in video arcade operators who suffer from sagging revenues when
experienced Pac-Man players either avoid the game or play continuously
on a single quarter. The kit included pressure-sensitive graphics which
incompletely obscured the Pac-Man name and cartoon figures on the ex-
terior of the game machines. 4
The kit's five ROM chips, which purchasers were to substitute for
the corresponding Pac-Man chips, were central to the controversy in
Midway. The sixth Pac-Man chip was to be removed and the sound sys-
tem disconnected. With the chip removed and the kit's other ROM
chips in place, the "characters" and other visual aspects of the game
would be quite changed; at an advanced stage of the game the kit would
make it more difficult for the "gobbler" character to elude pursuers.
The court issued a preliminary injunction in March 1982, prohibit-
ing Slayton from infringing any of Midway's copyrights in its Pac-Man
1. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. 11. 1983).
2. Id. at 743. Programs are imprinted on ROM chips in the form of miniscule patterns of
electronic circuits. Each chip has a specific location on a circuit board in a machine.
3. Id. at 742. Defendant Frederick Slayton a/k/a Roger Strohon was an "operator" of
video game machines, including the Pac-Man unit.
4. Id. at 744.
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game or misusing the Pac-Man trademarks.5 In June 1983, after review-
ing briefs from parties and amicus curiae,6 the court enjoined Slayton
from marketing the modification kit7 but denied a motion to hold Slayton
in civil contempt of the preliminary injunction because no copies of the
kit were actually sold.8
Midway raises a number of issues which continue to be debated in
the rapidly evolving field of computer copyright law, particularly within
the context of protection for video games. As a threshold issue, amicus
challenged Midway's right to control the use or alteration of the copy-
righted portions of Pac-Man game machines by the operators after its
first sale of those machines. 9 Amicus relied on patent cases in its argu-
ment, but the court found these inapposite.1" Another recent Midway
video game infringement case, Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic Inter-
national, Inc., held that defendant's "speed-up kit," which altered the
pace of Midway's copyrighted "Galaxian" game, created a "derivative"' 1
work based upon "Galaxian." Under the Copyright Act, copyright own-
ers have the exclusive right to authorize the preparation of derivative
works.' 2 Consequently, a licensee who installed the kit without Mid-
way's authorization to create a derivative work would be a direct in-
fringer of Midway's copyright and defendant seller would be a
contributory infringer.' 3
Following Artic, the Midway court concluded that the Cute-See kit
could not be distributed if it infringed any of the copyrights connected
5. Id. at 742.
6. Amicus curiae submitting briefs on behalf of Midway was SHIELD Video Game In-
dustry Legal Justice Committee. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 742.
7. Id. at 742-43. In addition to copyright infringement, marketing the Cute-See kit
would also have violated the "false designation of origin" section of the Lanham Act, § 43(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). The Cute-See graphics were intended to cover the Pac-Man name
but left the well-known cartoon figures visible on the game machine. The figures are widely
associated with Midway's Pac-Man. The court concluded that typical consumers would have
a "natural tendency" to assume that Cute-See and Pac-Man emanated from the same source.
Id. at 754.
8. Id. at 742.
9. Id. at 744.
10. Id. at 746.
11. 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1983).
A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, . . . sound recording, art reproduction . . .or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revi-
sions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.'
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
13. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013.
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with Pac-Man. Slayton could not use as a defense Midway's sale of the
machines in which Cute-See would be used.14
Slayton, however, argued that the audiovisual material produced by
the Cute-See kit in the course of play was not sufficiently similar to Pac-
Man to infringe Midway's "audiovisual works" copyright.15 To deter-
mine whether there was infringement, the court applied the Seventh Cir-
cuit's analysis articulated in another Pac-Man case, Atari, Inc. v. North
American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp. 6 Where plaintiff has a
valid copyright, infringement is established by proving that the defendant
copied the plaintiff's work. Absent direct evidence, copying may be in-
ferred where defendant has access to the work and there is "substantial
similarity" between the accused work and the copyrighted work.
17
Copyright law does not extend protection to ideas but only to particular
expression of ideas.18
In Atari, defendant's access was not disputed. The court explained
that although the "idea" of a maze-chase game is unprotectible, the au-
dio and visual aspects of the game constitute the copyrightable expres-
sion of the game's "idea."' 9 Pac-Man's distinctive central characters
distinguished it from conceptually similar video games.2" The Seventh
Circuit found that the disputed "K.C. Munchkin" game's central "gob-
bler" and "ghost monster" characters were so similar visually, aurally,
and behaviorally to their Pac-Man counterparts that an "ordinary ob-
server" could conclude only that North American copied Pac-Man. 2'
Following the reasoning in Atari, the Midway court held that there
was no infringement of the audiovisual copyright in Midway's Pac-Man
game because the distinctive copyrightable Pac-Man characters were not
present in the Cute-See version of the game.22 Midway established the
prima facie validity of its Pac-Man copyrights by registering both the
audiovisual display and underlying programs. 23 The burden was then on
14. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 746.
15. The Copyright Act defines "audiovisual works" as:
[w]orks that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
16. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
17. Id. at 614.
18. Id. at 615; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
19. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 618.
22. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 747.
23. See 17 U.S.C. 410(c) (1982).
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the defendant to overcome this presumption of validity.24 Slayton main-
tained that the two were so intertwined that the court's conclusion that
the audiovisual copyright was not infringed should also mean that the
underlying program was not infringed.2"
The Midway court rejected this reasoning. In Stern Electronics, Inc.
v. Kaufman,26 the court recognized the possibility of designing a game
that could infringe an audiovisual display but use a different computer
program. The converse of Stern was presented here: the possibility of
infringing a game's computer program but not its audiovisuals. Observ-
ing that two distinct types of creative processes were involved in creating
computer programs and audiovisuals, the judge expressly recognized that
the audiovisuals and computer programs connected with the game were
separately copyrightable.27
Having concluded that the underlying program directing the games
was copyrightable, the court considered the most significant and the
most difficult issue: whether the four instruction ROMs were developed
to operate the Pac-Man game or contained a "copy" of the computer
program.28 The court concluded that the ROMs were entitled to copy-
right protection as a computer program and that the Cute-See ROMs
infringed Midway's copyright.,9
The court reasoned that ROMs were encompassed within the defini-
tions of "copy" and "computer program" in the Copyright Act.30
ROMs contain the computer program stored in its "object code" form; it
is this binary machine-readable form of the human-readable "source
code" which is used directly by the computer to carry out its opera-
tions.3" Midway claimed copyright protection for its object code pro-
24. See Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
25. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 747.
26. 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (audiovisual displays copyrightable as audiovisual
works although underlying computer programs were not registered).
27. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 749.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. " 'Copies' are material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982). "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." This definition was added to
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) by the Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3028 (1980).
31. FORTRAN and BASIC are familiar examples of "source codes." Source code is
transformed within the computer into "object code" instructions; these direct the computer's
activity. Object code is embedded in electronic circuits on silicon chips, disks, or magnetic
19851
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gram. Programs written in source code are "clearly eligible" for
copyright protection. 2 The court found it "certain as a general matter"
that object code was also intended to be protected by current copyright
legislation.3" As the court observed, it would be "pyrrhic indeed" if the
stored object code version of the same protected source code program
could be freely reproduced without constituting an infringement.34
The court found no basis for the argument that object code stored
on a chip within the machine may be copied while the same code stored
externally on a disk or tape may not be copied." While it is true that
ROM chips are integral parts of the games machine as a form of electri-
cal circuitry, they also serve as repositories for computer instructions.
They are thus more than uncopyrightable utilitarian objects and not
more utilitarian than tapes or disks.36 ROM chips are "firmware," shar-
ing attributes of both software (programs) and hardware.37 A ROM chip
performs the same function as a disk or tape-it stores information
which directs the operations of a computer. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that Midway's copyright of its object code computer program
stored in ROM chips was valid.3a
A straightforward reading of the cited sections of the Copyright
Act, as well as legislative history, 9 compels agreement with the Midway
court's conclusions. Yet, legal authority exists supporting Slayton's ar-
gument that object code stored on ROMs is ineligible for copyright
protection.
tape. Object code instructions may be represented as "1" or "0", indicating the presence or
absence of an electrical charge. Written in this binary form, object code may be "read" di-
rectly by trained humans. See Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Read
Only Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329, 342 (1982).
32. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 750 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) which extends copy-
right protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.").
33. Id. (noting that "object code alone is able to be used 'directly' by a computer in carry-
ing out its operations").
34. Id. at 751.
35. Programs and data bases are included in the definition of literary works, defined in the
Copyright Act as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
. . . tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See N.
BooRSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW, §§ 2:21 (1981).
36. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 751-52.
37. Id. at 751.
38. Id. at 752.
39. See infra notes 49 and 57 and accompanying text.
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In Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,40 plaintiff claimed
infringement of the ROM copy of a copyrighted source code program
directing a hand-held chess game.4" The federal district court held that
the source code program was not a copy in its object code phase.4 2 Com-
puter programs in forms that were not human-readable were nothing
more than a "mechanical tool or machine part. 4 3
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., the district
court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction against Franklin's al-
leged infringement of Apple's copyrights on programs expressed in object
code and fixed in ROMs." The court questioned whether copyright was
limited to works read by a human reader.45 The court was not satisfied
that object code in binary or chip form was copyrightable expression be-
cause its purpose and function was to control a machine and not to com-
municate with a human audience.4 6
Judical concern for human readability is rooted in the hoary case of
White-Smith Music Publishing v. Apollo Co.,47 which held that a perfo-
rated piano roll was not a copy of plaintiff's musical composition because
it was unintelligible to the human eye. Although the 1976 Copyright Act
provided copyright protection for copies perceptible or communicated
"with the aid of a machine or device, "48 reference to conventional liter-
ary forms has slowed acceptance of new forms of expression as proper
subjects for copyright.4 9
40. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affid on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
41. Id. at 1065.
42. Id. at 1068. The court considered the case under the 1909 Copyright Act because the
marketing of the game occurred before the 1976 Act became effective. The court stated in
dicta that its conclusion would have been the same under the 1976 Act. Id. at 1006 n.4.
43. Id. at 1065.
44. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (appeal heard
subsequent to the ruling in Midway). The fourteen programs at issue were "operating systems
programs," designed to manage the internal function of the machines or facilitate use of "ap-
plication programs." The latter were used to perform a specific task for the computer user.
See Note, supra note 31, at 347. See generally Note, supra note 31 for excellent human-reada-
ble explanations of complex computer terminology and concepts and for full treatment of the
copyright protection for programs in ROMs. See also Note, Copyright Protection of Computer
Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1983) for argument in favor of copyright
protection of object code and presentation of roots of controversy.
45. Apple Computer, 545 F. Supp. at 821.
46. Id. at 824. The court suggested that its ruling would not necessarily apply to object
code programs in video arcade games which created visual displays for the players. Id. at 825.
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1979) for root of system/expression distinction in copyright
cases.
47. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
49. Congress established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
Denying copyright to programs in object code would leave no copy-
right protection for the embodiment of those programs in a ROM chip.
Relegating a ROM chip to the status of a machine part, as Slayton ar-
gued in Midway, would create a loophole in copyright coverage permit-
ting direct duplication of chips.50 Focusing on the physical aspects of
ROMs neglects their true purpose as repositories of original human ex-
pression. It was the intent of Congress to extend protection to such ex-
pressions, not to expose them to profligate copying.5 Congress recently
passed a new law52 which extends copyright protection to "mask
works,"53 the imprinted design patterns on semi-conductor chips. The
extension of copyright protection to something this far removed from
human readability clearly indicates the congressional intent to extend
copyright protection as broadly as possible to chips and to whatever in-
formation may be fixed on them.
In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc. , the district court
refused to follow the dicta in Data Cash. The court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that a chip was not a copy of plaintiff's
copyrighted original program and therefore the duplication of a chip was
righted Works (CONTU) in recognition of the need to revise the 1909 Copyright Act, particu-
larly in the area of computer technology. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, Title II,
88 Stat. 1873 (1974). CONTU's recommendations regarding programs were adopted in an
amendment to the 1976 Act. Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3028-29 (1980) (Act added definition of computer program to § 101 and revised § 117).
The CONTU majority opinion recommended extending copyright protection to object code
programs, including those stored in tape and disks. See Final Report of the National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), dated July 31, 1978, re-
printed in COPYRIGHT L. REv. (CCH) [Extra Ed. No. 2, Aug. 31, 1978] at 53-57 [hereinafter
cited as CONTU Final Report]. Lingering doubts were expressed in a dissent by Commis-
sioner Hersey, who would limit copyright protection to works that communicate to human
beings. See id. at 69-75.
50. See Wilbur, Copyright Registration for Secret Computer Programs: Robbery of the
Phoenix's Nest, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 357 (1984) for discussion of current limitations of copyright
protection for computer programs and proposal for revising registration requirements.
51. See supra note 49 and infra note 57 and accompanying text.
52. See Reagan Signs Copyright Law for Computer Chips, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, Part
IV (Business), at 1, col. 2. See also Cohodas, Computer Chips Protected, Trademark Statute
Clarified, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. Oct. 13, 1984 at 2641-43 (HR 6163 creates a new chap-
ter (9) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code specifically to prevent computer chips from unauthorized
copying: provides 10 years of protection).
53. " 'Mask work' means the 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional features of shapes, pattern,
and configuration (sic) of the surface of the layers of a semi-conductor chip product, regardless
of whether such features have an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not only to portray the
appearance of the product or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 901, reprinted in COPY-
RIGHT LAW REP. (CCI) 1 20,264, at 10,701 (June, 1984). Under § 909, protected mask
works will be designated with the letter M in a circle or the words "mask work," the year of
fixation in the chip and the name of the owner of the work. Id. at 10,705-10,706.
54. 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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not an infringement." Based on the legislative history and language of
the 1976 Copyright Act, the court determined that computer programs
were "works of authorship" fixed in the tangible medium of a silicon
chip56 and that Congress intended a broad reading of "fixation" to in-
clude such works.
57
The Third Circuit in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Interna-
tional, Inc.5" affirmed Tandy. Artic had sold as "kits" printed circuit
boards containing programs fixed in ROMs "virtually identical" to plain-
tiff's copyrighted program for its Defender video game. 59 The Third Cir-
cuit rejected the "human readability" and "machine part" arguments
posed by Artic who challenged the designation of ROMs as "copies" of
programs."t According to the court, the issue was not whether the ROM
itself was copyrightable, but whether the plaintiff's expression in an origi-
nal work embedded in ROMs satisfied the statutory fixation require-
ment.6" In concluding that it did, the court agreed with the Tandy
court's determination that Congress intended an "expansive interpreta-
tion of the terms 'fixation' and 'copy' which [would] encompass techno-
logical advances." 62 The court also agreed with Tandy that Congress did
not intend to create a loophole by confining infringement to copying text
while excluding duplication of programs fixed on chips.63
The Midway court relied extensively on the latter two cases in re-
jecting the Data Cash and Apple designation of ROMs as utilitarian ob-
jects." The Third Circuit, in turn drew heavily from Williams, Tandy,
and Midway when it considered Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
55. Id. at 175.
56. Id. at 173.
57. Id.
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation
may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures or any other
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written,
printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device
"now known or later developed."
(quoted by the Midway court from H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 52 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5659, 5665.
58. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 872.
60. Id. at 877.
61. Id. at 874.
62. Id. at 877. Echoing Tandy on Congressional intent, the court quoted the same mate-
rial and the language of the statutory definition of "copy" found in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 752.
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puter Corp. on appeal.6" The court in Apple Computer held that a com-
puter program is a "literary work," whether in its source code or in the
object code version in a ROM chip, and is protected from unauthorized
copying.66 The Third Circuit also rejected the district court's distinction,
for copyright purposes, between operating systems programs and appli-
cation systems programs; both types of programs instruct the computer
to do something and it was the instructions that Apple copyrighted.6"
Most convincing to the court was that Section 101 itself does not make
the distinction.6" The court rejected Franklin's argument that an operat-
ing system was just a machine part, noting that it could also be stored
outside the machine on disks or magnetic tape.69 The court added that
copyright is not precluded because a copyright is put to a utilitarian
use.
70
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. 71 the defen-
dant attempted to distinguish operating systems programs on ROMs as
uncopyrightable "ideas" and "processes," whereas applications systems
programs contain "expressions" communicated to the user when the pro-
gram is run on a computer. 72 The Ninth Circuit found that the defend-
ant provided "absolutely no authority" for such limited copyright
protection: "The computer program when written embodies expression;
never has the Copyright Act required that the expression be communi-
cated to a particular audience."
73
Midway provides an important link in a chain of cases extending
copyright protection beyond the limitation of the human intelligibility
doctrine to "non-visible" programs. As Franklin and Formula illustrate,
the impact of this chain of decisions interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act
has been felt outside of the narrow confines of the video game arcade.
Having found Midway's object code program in ROM chips copy-
rightable, the Midway court next considered whether the Cute-See
ROMs infringed the Pac-Man ROMs. Since access to the Pac-Man
ROMs was undisputed, copying could be inferred if the Cute-See and
65. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text.
66. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249.
67. Id. at 1251.
68. Id. at 1252.
69. Id. at 1251.
70. Id. at 1252 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) and majority opinion in
CONTU Final Report, supra note 49, at 53).
71. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 523-24.
73. Id. at 525.
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Pac-Man ROMs were "substantially similar."74 There was uncontra-
dicted expert testimony that there were "virtually an infinite number of
ways" to write a set of program instructions to produce the Pac-Man
game sequences; thus there was no necessity to track the Pac-Man pro-
gram sequences."
After comparing the four allegedly infringing ROMs to the Pac-
Man ROMs, the expert witnesses found an extremely high "ratio of iden-
tity" between Pac-Man and Cute-See instruction locations.76 The loca-
tion of the Cute-See program alterations also supported an inference of
copying: these were "patched" mostly into the blank or uncoded loca-
tions at the end of two of the Pac-Man ROMs.77
The court based its conclusion that the program on four Cute-See
instruction ROMs infringed the program on the corresponding Pac-Man
ROMs on the high degree of identity between them and the virtual im-
possibility that two programmers working independently would write
such nearly identical programs.7" The court was not persuaded by Slay-
ton's argument that all five of Slayton's ROMs and all six of Midway's
ROMs must be substantially similar to support infringement.7 9 Analo-
gizing to book publishing, the court observed that just as there would be
infringement in copying just one chapter, so there is piracy if data in two
Pac-Man ROMs were not copied while instructions in four other ROMs
were copied.80
The Midway court applied two methods for finding substantial simi-
larity between the two video games because of the dual nature of the
materials being compared. It first compared the behavior of cartoon
figures on the video screen for determining whether there was infringe-
ment of Midway's audiovisual copyright.8" The second substantial simi-
larity test, for the underlying "non-visible" instruction programs, relied
on comparisons of strings of object code in binary form. In both cases it
was necessary to first transform the disputed material into a form readily
perceptible by humans with the aid of a machine or device.
74. Midway, 654 F. Supp. at 752.
75. Id. at 753.
76. Id. at 752-53. The ratio found was ninety-seven percent; overall, eighty-nine percent
of 16,000 "bytes" of information in the Pac-Man ROMs were identically reproduced in the
corresponding Cute-See ROMs. There were long strings of identical corresponding locations,
one of which covered all but sixteen of 4,000 locations on the Pac-Man ROM.




81. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips, 672 F.2d 607, (7th Cir. 1982) for discussion of
appropriate tests for substantial similarity, particularly for video games.
1985]
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The substantial similarity analyses underscore the correctness of the
court's conclusion that chips are more than just machine parts; mere
machine parts cannot be transformed into expressions of human thought.
The analyses also reveal the complexities inherent in applying tests de-
rived from older media to new technologies. An ordinary reasonable ob-
server is unable to compare strings of binary code for overall similarity.
The question of what degree of similarity is required for a finding of in-
fringement of object code programs remains unanswered.82
Recent interpretations of existing copyright law protecting audiovi-
sual works and computer programs should affect the extent of piracy of
profitable video games. The new "mask works" law will protect manu-
facturers of computer chips used in increasingly pervasive settings, inci-
dentally including video game components. The overall effect of
expanding copyrightable subject matter will result in increased protec-
tion for the fruits of intellectual labor and entrepreneurial spirit in a rap-
idly expanding new technology.
Barbara B. Caretto
82. See Note, supra note 31, at 361-68, for discussion exploring this question in context of
proposal for new court procedures for infringement of firmware and software.
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2. Copyright Protection Of Video Games: Pac-Man And Galaxian
Granted Extended Play
Pac-Man and Galaxian have once again been granted extended play
of their copyright protections.' In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic
International, Inc. ,2 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's injunc-
tion prohibiting the infringement by Artic of Midway's copyrighted Pac-
Man and Galaxian video games. The injunction prohibited Artic's man-
ufacture or distribution of circuit boards for video machines that can be
used to play games similar to those protected by Midway's copyright.
The court upheld what is fast becoming an established principle of copy-
right law, that video games are subject to copyright protection as audio-
visual works under the 1976 Copyright Act.3
Midway is the manufacturer of the video games, Pac-Man and
Galaxian. Inside each video game machine are printed circuit boards
which store the images and sounds produced by the machine when the
games are played. The circuit boards also serve to control the rate of
speed at which the games are played.4
Artic sold printed circuit boards used inside video game machines.
One of the circuit boards sold by Artic, when inserted into a Galaxian
game machine, accelerated the rate of speed at which Galaxian was
1. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1982) (defendants' video game violated Atari's copyright by adopting the same basic charac-
ters of Pac-Man, and because of the substantial similarity of defendants' game to Pac-Man),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D.
Neb. 1981) (defendant infringed Midway's copyright by manufacturing and selling video
games virtually identical to Midway's Pac-Man and Galaxian video games).
2. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) provides that:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projec-
tors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the
works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) provides that:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include ...
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works. ...
4. See Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010, for a more detailed discussion of how video game ma-
chines operate.
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played.5 Artic also sold a circuit board that stored a set of images and
sounds nearly indistinguishable from Midway's Pac-Man, so that when
Artic's circuit board was inserted into a machine and played, the video
game looked and sounded like Pac-Man.6
Midway filed suit against Artic in federal district court for copyright
infringement of its Galaxian and Pac-Man video games.7 The district
court denied Artic's motion for summary judgment and granted Mid-
way's motion for a preliminary injunction. On appeal Artic argued that,
on the basis of the merits set forth in Midway's case, there was no show-
ing that Midway had a valid copyright infringement.'
The Seventh Circuit first determined whether video games are prop-
erly defined as audiovisual works protected by the 1976 Copyright Act.'
Audiovisual works are defined in Section 101 as a "series of related
images."1 Had the court narrowly construed the definitional phrase, "a
series of related images," to mean a set of images presented in a fixed
sequence of images and sounds which reappear every time the game is
played, video games would not meet the definition of an audiovisual
work. This is because every time a video game is played, a different se-
quence of images and sounds is produced on the screen of the video game
machine, depending upon how the game is played." Instead, the court
adopted a broad interpretation of the phrase. "[S]eries of related images"
means "any set of images displayed as some kind of unit."'I2 This conclu-
sion is consistent with earlier decisions involving the copyrightability of
video games which held that the repetitive sequence of the images and
sounds satisfied the fixation requirement of Title 17, Section 102(a), of
the United States Code.' 3
5. By increasing the rate in which the game is played, the profits to the video arcade
operator are increased because the player's playing time is cut short by the speeded-up rate.
Id. at 1013; JONES, COPYRIGHT, ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW 17 (1982).
6. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010-11.
7. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
8. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1011.
9. Id. at 1011; See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); See supra note 3.
11. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1011. See also Culler, Copyright Protection for Video Games. The
Court in the Pac-Man Maze, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 560 (1983-84).
12. See WGN Continental Brdcst'g Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir.
1982) (news program and a thematically related textual display transmitted on the same TV
signal was a single audiovisual work. The court supported its holding by noting that the legis-
lative history suggested that the Copyright Act be construed flexibly so as to adopt new
technologies).
13. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirmed
injunction restraining defendant from infringing plaintiff's copyright on audiovisual works and
computer progrim used in video game); Stem Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 854 (rejected de-
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The court next considered whether the playing of video games in-
volved creative effort of the player, rather than that of the game inven-
tor. 4 The Midway court recognized that the particular order of images
that appears on the screen of a video game machine when it is played is
not identical to the set of images stored in the machine's circuit boards.
This presented another difficulty in classifying video games as audiovi-
sual works. However, a video game player does not have the ability to
create any sequence he desires out of the images stored in the circuit
boards of the machine. The court ruled that "[p]laying a video game is
more like changing channels on a television than it is like writing a novel
or painting a picture." 5 The player is confined to choosing only those
sequences made available by the game.1 Therefore, it was the inventor,
not the player, who the court considered to be the creative actor behind
the playing of the game.
The court also rejected Artic's contention that, because the circuit
boards in which video games are fixed and patentable, they are not copy-
rightable. The court was quick to point out that Midway did not assert
copyright protection in the design of the circuit boards, but in the dis-
tinctive images and sounds stored in those boards.17
The court was equally unsympathetic to Artic's argument that the
1976 Copyright Act did not apply to Midway's video games because the
1980 amendment of Section 117 did not apply to copyrights granted
prior to the amendment's enactment. 8 Artic argued that, since Mid-
way's copyright was in existence before the amendment took effect, the
original Section 117 required the court to look to the 1909 Act and to the
fendant's contention that sights and sounds in video games failed to meet the fixation require-
ment and affirmed preliminary injunction barring defendant from distributing video games);
Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (fixation requirement was met because the
audiovisual works were fixed in the printed circuit boards of the video games; a preliminary
injunction issued).
14. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1011.
15. Id. at 1012.
16. Id. See also Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d at 874; Stern Elecs. v. Kauf-
man, 669 F.2d at 856.
17. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012. Artic cited Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (concerning computer program copyrights rather
than copyrights in audiovisual works fixed in such programs), in support of the assertion that
patentable circuit boards are not copyrightable. The court found the case distinguishable on
its facts.
18. Section 117, which provides for the exclusive rights of computer program owners
states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner
of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adapta-
tion . . . .Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the
copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
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common law. The court ruled that it was unnecessary to determine
whether the 1980 amendment was inapplicable. 9 The court was con-
vinced by the language and legislative history of the 1980 amendment
that the original Section 117 was not intended to permit the pirating of
works stored in computers, but was "intended only to leave unaltered the
existing law governing the exclusive rights of owners of copyrights in
computer programs.
20
Assuming the video games were copyrightable, Artic then argued
that the copyrights were invalid because the original publication of the
copyright lacked the proper notice required by Section 401 of the Copy-
right Act.21 Artic alleged that Midway obtained the copyright to the
video games in 1979 and 1980 from the Japanese company that invented
the games. The Japanese company that invented the games did not give
notice of its copyrights prior to assignment of the copyrights to Midway
in 1979 and 1980. Therefore, Artic contended, the copyrights were inva-
lid.22 However, the court rejected this argument, relying on Section
405(a)(2) of the Copyright Act which allows a copyright owner five years
in which to register a work where notice of the copyright was previously
omitted, and found that Midway registered the games within five years of
their acquisition from the Japanese company.23
The final and most significant issue decided by the court was
whether circuit boards that speed up the rate of play of Midway's video
games constituted an infringement of Midway's copyrights. Artic argued
that there was no copyright infringement because speeding the play of a
video game was akin to playing a phonograph record of 33 RPM at 45 or
78 RPM, which would probably not be a copyright infringement. 24 The
court rejected the analogy. "There is an enormous demand for speeded-
19. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012.
20. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 97-1307, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 27 (1980) (Part I) (Judici-
ary Committee), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6486; H.R. REP. No.
97-1307, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 27 (1980) (Part II) (Committee on Government Operations),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6509.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982) provides:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or else-
where . . . a notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on all
publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1982). The court suggested that if Artic had maintained that
Midway failed to put notice of copyright on any of the video games Midway distributed in the
United States, or if there had been an allegation that the copyright infringements of Midway's
video game machines were due to the omission of the notice of copyright originally published
in Japan, the court might have decided differently. Midway, 704 F.2d 1013.




up video games but . . little if any demand for speeded-up records."25
The court further held that, because "[a] speeded-up video game is a
substantially different product from the original,"26 the speeded-up
game is a derivative work and protected by Title 17, Section 106(2) of the
United States Code.27 The court concluded that it was the intent of Con-
gress that the language of Section 106 be construed broadly enough to
accommodate new technologies such as speeded-up video games.28
Midway illustrates that video game machines, as audiovisual works,
are within the sphere of protection that Congress intended in the 1976
Copyright Act. Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the
rights of artists and inventors were guarded under the 1909 Copyright
Act. However, the 1909 Act only protected those forms of expression or
media that were explicitly outlined in the Act. Thus, the 1909 Copyright
Act was inadequate, for it failed to provide for technological growth.29
So, with the advent of the 1976 Copyright Act, courts have followed
congressional intent and construed the 1976 Act to incorporate new tech-
nologies."a Cases involving the copyrightability of video games have sim-
ilarly followed suit.
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit in Midway characterized video
games as audiovisual works, thereby bringing them within the sphere of
protection of the 1976 Copyright Act. The Midway court deviated from
prior cases involving video games which focused on the fixation require-
ment of Section 102(a). a' Instead, the court directed its attention to the
definitional phrase, "series of related images," in ruling that video games
are audiovisual works subject to copyright protection. By defining the
25. Id. See also supra note 5.
26. Id. at 1014.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982) states that a copyright owner has exclusive rights to produce
derivatives based on the original work. Derivative work is defined as "[W]ork based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fiction-
alization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982). See also Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d at 618-19
n.12.
28. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1014. See also WGN Continental Brdcst'g, 593 F.2d 622.
29. McKenna, Copyrightability of Video Games: Stern and Atari, 14 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 391
(1983).
30. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5660; see also McKenna, Copyrightability of Video Games: Stern and Atari,
14 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 391 (1983).
31. See, Atari, 672 F.2d 607; Midway, 543 F. Supp. 466; Williams Elecx, 685 F.2d 870.
These decisions limited the scope of analysis to whether video games are within the subject
matter of copyright protection. Whereas, here, the court ruled that video games are audiovi-
sual works and are protected under the 1976 Copyright Act.
1985]
